[Enigmail] From offlist

Phil Stracchino alaric at metrocast.net
Tue Mar 3 18:26:40 PST 2009


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Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> You send them an email and ask for their key.  They email it back to
> you, and you import it to your local keyring.  It's possible for a
> malicious attacker to have replaced the public key your correspondent
> sent you with a public key of the attacker's choosing, though -- what we
> call a Man In The Middle attack -- so it's important to verify that you
> received the correct key.  The usual way to do this is to contact your
> friend by some method other than email and ask them for a fingerprint of
> their key.  If the fingerprint they give you matches the one you find by
> looking at your copy of their key, then you have the correct key.

Barring, of course, the extremely unlikely case of fingerprint
collisions, by chance or design.  If you're being attacked by someone
with enough savvy and processing power to engineer a by-design key
fingerprint collision more or less in real time, the odds are you're
already completely screwed anyway, so there's relatively little point in
worrying about it.


- --
  Phil Stracchino, CDK#2     DoD#299792458     ICBM: 43.5607, -71.355
  alaric at caerllewys.net   alaric at metrocast.net   phil at co.ordinate.org
         Renaissance Man, Unix ronin, Perl hacker, Free Stater
                 It's not the years, it's the mileage.
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